Crab Nebula M1

I took this picture a couple years ago around when I first started astrophotography. When I processed all of the data for this picture I was amazed at the result being that this is all unguided 30 second exposures. I used a 7″ MakCass and a Cannon 60D

It’s a little green but I think it’s pretty good for just starting off.

I hope you liked this post!!!!!

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Bodes Nebulae M81

These are pictures of Bodes Nebulae M81 that were taken with a Celestron C11 with a hyperstar, guide scope, asimcpro camera, PHD2 for tracking, Siril stacking, and gimp post processing. My gimp skills aren’t that great yet, but improving.

This is the best post processed one I currently have.

Without post processing

So with the hyperstar, I was only able to do around 15-30 second subs. I think because the Focal ratio is reduced so much that the amount of light it is gathering washes out the exposure quicker. If you have any advice on how I can improve, please leave a comment. Thank you.

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Ring Nebula Messier 57

These are pictures of the Ring Nebula I took with a 7″ MakCass, Cannon 60D, PHD2, OAG. Used Siril for stacking and gimp for postprocessing.

The best post processing I could do.

Zoomed in and cropped.

This is most of the frame

I hope you enjoyed this post. This is a hobby I really enjoy and it is nice to be able to share my progress with you all.

Stay tuned for more astrophotography from copypasteearth.com !!!!!!!!!!🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭🔭

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Test Driven Development for Existing Codebases

Test Driven Development or TDD can be a useful deterrent for bugs in huge codebases. Writing tests can get complex when trying to introduce them into an existing codebase, especially if there is tightly coupled classes. One way to start doing TDD in an existing codebase is to start introducing unit tests for each bug that the engineer is working on. Ideally every time an engineer is fixing a bug, they would make the unit test that would verify the expected behavior, then once they have the unit test failing, they would actually fix the bug. If engineers took this approach to start doing TDD in an existing codebase, eventually code coverage will grow as the bugs are resolved one by one.

One problem with introducing TDD into an existing project is the testability of the code. Depending on the quality of the architecture and design patterns used in the codebase and amount of coupling, the engineer might have to do substantial refactoring to make the code testable. Either way refactoring code to be testable is actually a major improvement which will facilitate more ease of development. Other engineers will be more confident that they will not break other parts of code once tests are introduced from other TDD tasks and code coverage climbs.

TDD can be a very powerful way to ensure quality of production code and engineers will have to deal with a great deal less of bugs in the long run. At first doing TDD in an existing codebase will take longer than if it was done since the beginning of writing the application. Once the coverage gets to a certain point in an application, the code should be refactored to be testable enough that engineers will take less time to introduce new tests and code.

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Smart Thermostats

While doing security research dealing with IOT devices and home security, I decided to look into smart thermostats.  While Googles Nest series of IOT devices seem to have the greatest security built into them it appears that the Google Nest Thermostat has a security vulnerability.  In this day in age even the big companies like Google, Amazon, Samsung, etc.… still have vulnerabilities in their so called “Smart” devices.  Even though these big companies still sometimes overlook a vulnerability in their IOT devices, purchasing a device from a big company is probably the consumers best bet in getting the best security tested device.  Google is not a newcomer into the world of security, and they seem to do a very good job of releasing secure devices into the world but the war dealing with computer security is a never-ending battle and sometimes hackers even get one over on Google.  I am a big fan of Google and what they do in the technological world and I have many Google devices powering my home.  Fortunately, I do not have the Google Nest Thermostat and I don’t know if I will ever wind up getting a Smart thermostat anyway.  In this document I will go over what the Google Nest Thermostat is, how this vulnerability can be taken advantage of, and what Google is doing, or the user can do to prevent becoming victim to this vulnerability.

         The Google Nest Thermostat is a smart thermostat that is part of Googles line of IOT devices.  The capabilities of this thermostat are built in WIFI, a temperature sensor, a humidity sensor, 24-bit color display, and is available in 5 different languages (Google, 2020).  If you would like to buy one of these smart thermostats it will cost about $249.00.  Google states on their web site that this thermostat is compatible with 95% of heating and cooling systems.  This thermostats operating system is Linux based and has menus for switching from heating to cooling, access to device settings, energy history, and scheduling (Wikipedia, 2020).  Since its first appearance in the market, it has been given many security updates and to get an update it requires two factor authentications.  This thermostat connects to all other Nest devices through a protocol called Weave that is done over WIFI.

         The vulnerability on the Google Nest thermostat is taken advantage of by connecting to it by the USB port with a flash drive and while holding the power button for 10 seconds a person can inject malicious software into the devices (Wagenseil, 2014).  This malicious software can be of any type mainly botnets or spying software.  Note that to achieve gaining access to this vulnerability the malicious user has to have physical access to the device.  This type of hack was demonstrated by three security researchers at a Blackhat conference on August 7, 2014.  The three researchers’ names were Yier Jin, Grant Hernandez, and Daniel Buentello (Wagenseil, 2014).  The nest thermostat appears to have very good security when it comes to wireless communications, but the USB is quite insecure.  The nest devices know much of a user’s private information like if they are home or not, their postal code, usernames and passwords.  Since it knows this type of information, this vulnerability could be very dangerous if the right hacker gains access to it.  The malicious software injected into the nest thermostat can also be used to gain access to other devices on the network which could be done using an ARP(Address Resolution Protocol) tool (Tilley, 2015).

         The Nest company is trying to become the biggest name in home connected devices.  The company’s founder says that they have a team in place to test for vulnerabilities and that they do extensive testing on all of their devices.  I am sure that after this vulnerability was found out that the Nest company has pushed an update of some sort to patch the device.  The Nest company has also stated that if a hacker has physical access to a device no matter what device it is, that they can potentially hack the device.  To prevent becoming a victim of this type of attack I think the user should always be aware of who they let inside their home.  Since physical access to the device is necessary to exploit this vulnerability, like some other devices I have researched, being aware of who is in your home is a big thing.  The user should always make sure that all of their IOT devices are up to date with the latest security patches.  The reason that the Nest thermostat allows a person to connect with a flash USB and load software onto it is so the firmware can be manually updated.  I guess the Nest company did not see this as a great threat.

         To conclude I would like to state that I like the Google Nest Company.  I think that they are on a solid path to becoming the most used IOT home devices.  I like how all of their devices work together on the same network and I think that the company itself takes great pride in their security practices.  This hack may possibly be an example of something that could be inevitable in the process of designing an IOT device.  Maybe Nest is right that any device can be hacked if a malicious user has physical access to it.  I personally do not have a smart thermostat because I only change the temperature on mine about twice a year, but I love the idea of having your thermostat become smart so that if you are away on vacation or something like that you can control the temperature of your home from far away.

Works Cited

Google. (2020, April 9). Nest Thermostat Specifications. Retrieved from store.google.com: https://store.google.com/us/product/nest_learning_thermostat_3rd_gen_specs

Tilley, A. (2015, March 6). How Hackers Could Use A Nest Thermostat As An Entry Point Into Your Home. Retrieved from forbes.com: https://www.forbes.com/sites/aarontilley/2015/03/06/nest-thermostat-hack-home-network/#788408d39864

Wagenseil, P. (2014, August 7). Nest Smart Thermostat Can Be Hacked to Spy on Owners. Retrieved from tomsguide.com: https://www.tomsguide.com/us/nest-spying-hack,news-19290.html

Wikipedia. (2020, April 9). Nest Learning Thermostat. Retrieved from wikipedia.org: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nest_Learning_Thermostat#Hardware

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Garage Door Opener

Researching security vulnerabilities in IOT devices, specifically dealing with the issue of home security I decided to look into garage door openers.  I came across this article that says there is a man who has developed a way to crack the code of the ordinary garage door.  This kind of hack could be disastrous to a homeowner because it lets a malicious user gain access to many houses that have an entrance to their house through the garage.  There is not just one garage door opener that is susceptible to this hack, many garage doors are.  I personally would not want anyone to be able to open my garage door and gain access to my house and with the knowledge of this research I am going to look into the brand and the garage door opener that I have to make sure that this vulnerability is not able to be done on my garage door.  Many people have these garage door openers that are susceptible to this hack and they may need to upgrade their garage door to prevent being a victim of this attack.  There are actually two kinds of codes that can be cracked by this security researcher’s method, the first one was discovered earlier than the other because the later is more difficult to hack.  These two kinds of codes are called “fixed code” and “rolling code” and there are many garage door openers that use these kinds of codes to allow access to your garage and possibly your house.  In this document I will go over what garage door openers are susceptible to this attack, how the attack is implemented, and what a user can do to prevent being a victim of this type of attack.

There are many brands of garage door openers that are susceptible to this hack.  Some of them include Nortek, NorthShore, Chamberlain, Liftmaster, Stanley, Delta-3, and Moore-O-Matic (Kamkar).  The attack was designed by Samy Kamkar and he states that only garage doors with fixed code entry systems are vulnerable to this attack although he has also developed a hack for garage doors with the rolling code entry systems.  Samy Kamkar has presented his rolling code hack for garage doors at DEFCON 23.  The difference between fixed code and rolling code is that the fixed code system uses the same two-character code every time to open the door and rolling code changes the two-character code every time the garage door is opened.  There are other kinds of systems that use hopping codes, Security+, or Intellicode and Samy Kamkar says that these doors may be safer from this kind of hack but they are not foolproof (Kamkar).  Wired.com has requested comment from companies like Nortek and Genie but they didn’t respond at first about the vulnerability and then posted on their website it is stated that they use rolling codes (Greenberg, 2015).  Later on, after Kamkar figured out how to hack fixed code systems he also found out how to hack rolling code systems.  The owners of the Liftmaster brand of garage door openers stated that they have not used fixed code systems since 1992 but Kamkar looked into a manual from a 2007 version and said he found that it uses a fixed code system (Greenberg, 2015).

         Samy Kamkar has posted the code that he used to crack the fixed code systems and the code that he used to crack the rolling code systems, but he intentionally sabotaged the code that he posted so malicious users would have a tough time getting the code to work.  To crack the codes Kamkar uses brute force to find the right code for each door.  The doors that he tested use at most 12 bits which is 4096 possible combinations (Greenberg, 2015).  Using a brute force technique to crack the code for these garage doors would take about 29 minutes but Kamkar improved it by taking out wait periods between trying generated codes, removing redundant transmissions, and optimization that allows transmission of overlapped codes (Greenberg, 2015).  With all of the optimizations that Kamkar has put into his code, he reduced the time of using brute force to crack the individual codes from 29 minutes down to 8 seconds (Kamkar).  Kamkar says you need to be an expert in RF signals and microcontrollers to be able to fix the code that he has posted on GitHub and use it.  Using brute force to crack a code usually takes a very long time to do because the algorithm tries every possible combination to find the right code.  I think it is quite the feat that Kamkar got the brute force algorithm down to only 8 seconds to find the code from the original 29 minutes.

         Preventing the ability to become victim to this kind of attack would require the user to actually completely change out their garage door opener.  Since the time of this discovery by Samy Kamkar, garage door opener manufacturers or designers should have made design decisions to implement greater security measures into their products.  This is not an example of poor security design by garage door companies because these garage doors were out for a very long time before the ability to hack into them became present.  It is and example of how fast technology is evolving and the need for greater security implementation grows with the technology.  These vulnerable garage door openers were tested with this hack using two-character codes, maybe companies will adopt a secure code encryption with like SHA1 or something like that.

         To conclude I would like to state that garage doors openers are just one of the many IOT devices in a person’s home today.  This number of IOT devices in a user’s home is increasing day by day.  More and more people are turning to the convenience of IOT devices.  Security vulnerabilities are a common thing with home IOT devices and companies need to ramp up their testing of security.  I think it is clear that the companies that allow these vulnerabilities to be present in their devices are going to lose more business and actually the whole business may go bankrupt as a result.  I think if a company is going to build an IOT device for use in a person’s home that there should be security testing guidelines and a certification for the product they are building so the end user knows exactly what they can expect from a security standpoint of their product.

Works Cited

Greenberg, A. (2015, June 4). This Hacked Kids’ Toy Opens Garage Doors in Seconds. Retrieved from wired.com: https://www.wired.com/2015/06/hacked-kids-toy-opens-garage-doors-seconds/

Kamkar, S. (n.d.). Open Sesame. Retrieved from samy.pl: http://samy.pl/opensesame/

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privacy policy for genie lamp free

Privacy Policy

built the Genie Lamp Free app as an Ad Supported app. This SERVICE is provided by at no cost and is intended for use as is.

This page is used to inform visitors regarding my policies with the collection, use, and disclosure of Personal Information if anyone decided to use my Service.

If you choose to use my Service, then you agree to the collection and use of information in relation to this policy. The Personal Information that I collect is used for providing and improving the Service. I will not use or share your information with anyone except as described in this Privacy Policy.

The terms used in this Privacy Policy have the same meanings as in our Terms and Conditions, which is accessible at Genie Lamp Free unless otherwise defined in this Privacy Policy.

Information Collection and Use

For a better experience, while using our Service, I may require you to provide us with certain personally identifiable information. The information that I request will be retained on your device and is not collected by me in any way.

The app does use third party services that may collect information used to identify you.

Link to privacy policy of third party service providers used by the app

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I want to inform you that whenever you use my Service, in a case of an error in the app I collect data and information (through third party products) on your phone called Log Data. This Log Data may include information such as your device Internet Protocol (“IP”) address, device name, operating system version, the configuration of the app when utilizing my Service, the time and date of your use of the Service, and other statistics.

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Cookies are files with a small amount of data that are commonly used as anonymous unique identifiers. These are sent to your browser from the websites that you visit and are stored on your device’s internal memory.

This Service does not use these “cookies” explicitly. However, the app may use third party code and libraries that use “cookies” to collect information and improve their services. You have the option to either accept or refuse these cookies and know when a cookie is being sent to your device. If you choose to refuse our cookies, you may not be able to use some portions of this Service.

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I may employ third-party companies and individuals due to the following reasons:

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I want to inform users of this Service that these third parties have access to your Personal Information. The reason is to perform the tasks assigned to them on our behalf. However, they are obligated not to disclose or use the information for any other purpose.

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I value your trust in providing us your Personal Information, thus we are striving to use commercially acceptable means of protecting it. But remember that no method of transmission over the internet, or method of electronic storage is 100% secure and reliable, and I cannot guarantee its absolute security.

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This Service may contain links to other sites. If you click on a third-party link, you will be directed to that site. Note that these external sites are not operated by me. Therefore, I strongly advise you to review the Privacy Policy of these websites. I have no control over and assume no responsibility for the content, privacy policies, or practices of any third-party sites or services.

Children’s Privacy

These Services do not address anyone under the age of 13. I do not knowingly collect personally identifiable information from children under 13. In the case I discover that a child under 13 has provided me with personal information, I immediately delete this from our servers. If you are a parent or guardian and you are aware that your child has provided us with personal information, please contact me so that I will be able to do necessary actions.

Changes to This Privacy Policy

I may update our Privacy Policy from time to time. Thus, you are advised to review this page periodically for any changes. I will notify you of any changes by posting the new Privacy Policy on this page. These changes are effective immediately after they are posted on this page.

Contact Us

If you have any questions or suggestions about my Privacy Policy, do not hesitate to contact me at copypasteearth@gmail.com.

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Smart Stove Hack that lets Hackers Turn on your Stove

While researching security vulnerabilities in IOT devices focusing on home security, smart ovens came to mind.  I thought what could be worse than a hacker getting into a person’s smart oven and burning their house down to the ground.  It turns out that there is an exact hack of this type in a smart oven. Security involving IOT devices is an important aspect in the safety of a user’s home and I actually couldn’t believe that there is a hack that would let a malicious user turn on an oven.  Say that a user had some dish towels or something on their oven range that is flammable and then they went off to work only to come home to their house burnt to a crisp because a hacker turned on their stove while they were gone.  As I research security vulnerabilities in IOT devices it is becoming more and more clear that the companies that produce these smart home gadgets are lacking very much in security testing of their devices.  In this document I will go over what oven has this type of security vulnerability, how this type of hack is executed, and what a user can do to prevent this type of security vulnerability from burning down their house.

         The smart oven that has this security vulnerability is the AGA Range Cooker.  The vulnerability was discovered by Pen Test Partners.  These range cookers are very expensive so you would think that the company would have done extensive security testing on their appliances but that doesn’t seem to be the case.  Pen Test Partners say that they tried to disclose the vulnerability to the AGA company through Twitter and AGA blocked them.  Pen Test Partners finally got through to AGA via their technical support (LAIDLAW, 2017).  It was important for Pen Test Partners to get in contact with AGA appliance company before they disclosed the vulnerability so that there could be something done about it before the information got into the wrong hands.  Something like this allowing a malicious user the ability to burn your house down could really tarnish a company’s name. The AGA company seems very reluctant to fix this vulnerability. This oven draws a maximum of 30 amps which is enough to burn a house down.  The owners of this type of oven should know that if they have the latest model with the remote control option then there is a possibility that they could be victim of this kind of attack (Leyden, 2017).

         The hack in this smart oven is executed by an SMS that is unauthenticated and is sent from the ovens mobile application running on the user’s phone.  The oven has a SIM card that costs the user around 5 dollars a month.  The user could send a command to turn on all of the burners at once and since the SMS from the mobile application is not authenticated that means that a malicious user can perform an enumeration attack.  Enumeration is a process to establish an active connection to a target machine to discover potential attacks (Chakravartula, 2018).  Once the malicious user slowly but effectively uses enumeration to find the smart ovens phone number they can just simply send an SMS command to it.  The command would look something like this “WebtextPass,35257,Baking Oven On” (Leyden, 2017).  The enumeration attack could potentially take a while to execute because it is like a brute force attack to obtain the smart ovens phone number.  AGA is being criticized by security testers because they say that making a WIFI interface would have been cheaper and safer than using a SIM card with a phone number for every device.  It is amazing to me that AGA designed a device with a SIM card and a phone number but totally lacked when it came to security testing the device.  I don’t even know if there is a patch that could be made for a device that is controlled this way.  Maybe that is why the AGA company is reluctant to provide a fix for their vulnerable devices.

         With this vulnerability disclosed to the public, a consumer should be very cautious when buying a smart appliance from AGA.  The company probably lost a considerable amount of business because of this problem and it’s their own fault.  I’m not sure if there is anything that an owner of one of these devices can do to prevent being a victim of this attack except for just throwing away their smart stove and getting a new one from a different manufacturer.  I guess the owner of this type of smart oven can remove the SIM card and only operate their stove the old-fashioned way.  They could probably cancel the remote access option on the smart stove since they are paying a monthly plan for it anyway.  If AGA doesn’t come up with a patch to this vulnerability then the owner of the smart stove pretty much has no other option than to disable the remote-control option, otherwise risk their house being burnt down by a malicious arson with too much time on their hands.

         To conclude, I would like to state that security testing should be a major part of a producer of IOT devices software engineering process.  This is especially the case for companies that make IOT devices that operate inside a user’s home.  This smart oven is just another of the many mistakes made by companies producing these smart devices.  With the outrageous price tag that AGA is putting on their smart ovens I’m sure that consumers would appreciate some sort of security certification or something of the sort to go along with the smart device so that they can have some type of assurance that the product was produced correctly with a substantial amount of security vulnerability testing done.

Works Cited

Chakravartula, R. (2018, February 28). What is Enumeration? Retrieved from resources.infosecinstitute.com: https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/what-is-enumeration/#gref

LAIDLAW, J. (2017, April 20). HALF BAKED IOT STOVE COULD BE USED AS A REMOTE CONTROLLED ARSON DEVICE. Retrieved from hackaday.com: https://hackaday.com/2017/04/20/half-baked-iot-stove-could-be-used-as-a-remote-controlled-arson-device/

Leyden, J. (2017, Aprin 13). Half-baked security: Hackers can hijack your smart Aga oven ‘with a text message’. Retrieved from theregister.co.uk: https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/04/13/aga_oven_iot_insecurity/

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Smart Refrigerator Security Vulnerability

These days we are in the IOT revolution.  Everyone is flocking to the electronic stores to purchase smart appliances, so they have more convenience in their everyday lives.  Security vulnerabilities are being found by security researchers constantly as these new smart devices find their way to the stores.  It seems that for every IOT device that is released there is a corresponding security threat that seems to be discovered.  It turns out that even a smart refrigerator could be vulnerable to malicious people trying to obtain a user’s personal information.  While researching smart refrigerator vulnerabilities I came across a hack that lets malicious users obtain a user’s Google login credentials and I thought that this hack is definitely noteworthy.  In this document I will go over who discovered this smart refrigerator vulnerability, details on how this vulnerability is utilized, and what a user can do to prevent being a victim of this security vulnerability.

         This hack to find out a user’s Google login credentials through the Samsung smart refrigerator was discovered by security researchers at a security company named Pen Test Partners.  These security researchers discovered this hack at an IOT hacking challenge called the Def Con Security Conference (Neagle, 2015).  Security researchers at Pen Test Partners went through a bunch of different routes to find vulnerabilities in the Samsung smart refrigerator like firmware attacks, tearing down the mobile app, and TCP services (Venda, 2015).  Where the security researchers found the vulnerability was in the smart refrigerators implementation of SSL because it failed to validate the SSL certificates.  Since the refrigerator failed to validate the SSL certificates, that led to the ability of performing a man in the middle attack allowing a malicious user to obtain Google login credentials because the refrigerator has a Google calendar application on it letting a user post calendar events and notes on the door of the refrigerator.  Having a Google calendar on the door of your refrigerator sounds like a great idea and could be very convenient in organization of tasks and meetings for a user’s family.  Unfortunately, the hack discovered by Pen Test Partners makes the Google Calendar a prime target for the user’s personal information.

         This smart refrigerator hack is basically a man in the middle attack.  A man in the middle attack is when a malicious user is listening for packets between a device and servers communications.  Since the SSL implementation in the Samsung smart refrigerator does not validate the SSL certificates, that means that anyone can intercept the information being exchanged by the refrigerator and the server with a packet sniffer like Wireshark.  Packet sniffers like Wireshark can intercept information being transmitted over a network, specifically unencrypted information (Nohe, 2018).  This hack could be the result of the lack of security testing on the Samsung smart refrigerator where the developers of the refrigerators smart abilities just did not know how to implement SSL correctly.  It seems that this hack could be easily fixed with a software update and Samsung has reported that they are looking into the vulnerability (Neagle, 2015).  Although having your Google credentials exposed to a malicious user could be a very terrible thing, the malicious user would have to be able to have access to the same network that the smart refrigerator is a part of to be able to execute this attack.

         Personally, I would love to have a refrigerator with the kind of functionality that this Samsung smart refrigerator has.  The convenience of having my Google calendar presented on the door of the refrigerator with all of my notes and to-do lists could be very beneficial.  The first thing you would have to do to prevent this kind of hack from victimizing you is that you have to be very aware of who has access to the network that your refrigerator is running on.  I am sure that once Samsung was notified about this vulnerability that they made some updates to the refrigerators system software.  Always keep your IOT devices software up to date with the latest software because that is how many security vulnerabilities are combatted.  It is a shame that this kind of vulnerability was present in this smart refrigerator because a user’s Google credentials should always be kept confidential and the ability to do a man in the middle attack on a smart refrigerator should be addressed immediately.

         Although the man in the middle attack on this smart refrigerator doesn’t seem like a very severe security threat, it is still nonetheless a pretty substantial vulnerability. No one wants their personal information exposed to any malicious users in the technological world and this hack gave malicious users yet another way to deceive the regular users of IOT devices.  As I do more and more research on IOT devices and their vulnerabilities, it seems that company’s software engineering practices need to implement more security testing.  Samsung is a very big corporation with many customers, and I am sure that they already do plenty of security testing, but this is evidence that even the larger companies need to ramp up their security practices.

Works Cited

Neagle, C. (2015, August 26). Smart refrigerator hack exposes Gmail login credentials. Retrieved from networkworld.com: https://www.networkworld.com/article/2976270/smart-refrigerator-hack-exposes-gmail-login-credentials.html

Nohe, P. (2018, November 29). Executing a Man-in-the-Middle Attack in just 15 Minutes. Retrieved from thessistore.com: https://www.thesslstore.com/blog/man-in-the-middle-attack-2/

Venda, P. (2015, August 18). Hacking DefCon 23’s IoT Village Samsung fridge. Retrieved from pentestpartners.com: https://www.pentestpartners.com/security-blog/hacking-defcon-23s-iot-village-samsung-fridge/

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Smart Lightbulb Vulnerabilities

In the past year people have spent about eight billion dollars on smart lightbulbs to conveniently illuminate their homes.  Over the next year, that price point is estimated to jump to about 28 billion because more and more people are turning to smart devices around their houses for the convenience that they provide (Min, 2019).  Smart lightbulbs seem simple when you think about them as far as functionality goes.  You can turn your light on, turn your light off, and with the smart lightbulbs today you can even have them change brightness or color according to music or video that is playing in the house, blending in with multimedia.  But little do the consumers know that there are flaws in the security layer of their smart lightbulbs.  Some smart lightbulbs specifically the ones that change brightness and color according to multimedia playing along with it can let hackers infer the actual media playing along with the light, like audio or video.  Some smart lights that have an infrared function, hackers have shown that a covert data exfiltration threat can be done with them (MAITI, 2019).  In this document I will first go into detail about the video-audio inference threat, details about the covert data exfiltration threat, and conclude with a section on preventive measures that can be taken so the user does not fall victim to these threats.

         The video and audio inference threat that is present in smart lightbulbs lets a malicious user know what song or video a user is playing along with the lightbulbs ability to change brightness according to the media that is playing.  This is a big problem because there is a law called the US Video Privacy Protection Act to prevent getting a user’s media information like this because it can reveal personal interests and preferences (MAITI, 2019).  While this threat is actually difficult to set up and exploit, it is still possible to do.  The smart lightbulbs in examination of this threat change brightness and hue according to the different media that is playing in conjunction with them.  It turns out that the audio waveform and the fluctuations in brightness in the smart lightbulb have similar graphs(MAITI, 2019) and with this information a malicious user, having a library of songs to compare the light fluctuation to, can infer the media type from. To achieve this inference, the malicious user needs a luminance meter and a library of media to reference.  For the difference in luminance when the hue option is used in the smart lightbulb, an RGB sensor should be used.  The researchers tested audio in intervals from 15 seconds to 120 seconds and as you would expect, the accuracy of inferring the media that the user is engaged in is greater the longer the observation. The same holds for video but the time intervals were from 60 seconds to 360 seconds (MAITI, 2019).  Inferring a user’s audio and video usage is a really dangerous threat.  Because there is a law protecting users’ privacy when it comes to media consumption, I think that this threat is potentially very dangerous.

         The covert data exfiltration threat is present in smart lightbulbs because in theory, any light can transmit data.  The research says that this threat is available on smart lights that do not have a hub connecting the lights or having a hub but without permission controls.  Using this threat, a malicious user can obtain data from an unsuspecting users’ private network.  The researchers tested obtaining data using the infrared light from a smart lightbulb sending strings and images through the network.  Using the infrared light from the bulb the researchers were able to get binary data from the different power levels of the bulb. 

Text at 15 meters

Original Text: A cup of sugar makes sweet fudge 

Reconstructed Text: A buq pf!sugbr m`kessuees hudfe 

As you can see, this is a very dangerous threat that is present in these smart lightbulbs.  Anyone can use this threat to obtain any sensitive information about the users over a private network.

         These threats in smart lightbulbs are actually very difficult to utilize.  Given the right tools and proximities, a malicious user may be able to use these threats to obtain personal information.  First, I would like to note proximity.  To prevent these threats from being executed in your home network, proximity is vital to the execution and extraction or inference of your data.  Be careful who you let into your private network or into your home.  If a malicious user is too far away from your devices the information obtained may be too degraded for malicious use by the time the malicious user gets the information.  Both of these threats can be done through a window.  I would say that curtains that do not let any light through them could be a good preventive measure taken against these threats.  You should buy smart lightbulbs that connect to a hub with permission controls.  The research says that lightbulbs connected to a hub with permission controls are not susceptible to the covert exfiltration threat.

         Although smart lightbulbs are very convenient to the extent that you no longer have to get up and go to a switch to turn them off and on, and they provide some extra features like musical or video lighting, they are prone to security vulnerabilities.  As I found out doing this research, even though light bulbs have very crude electronic circuitry and seem very simple, they evidently provide multiple access points for a user’s sensitive data to malicious users.  I don’t know if there could be any better of a software engineering practice to prevent these types of threats, but there has to be some type of remedy.  Security researchers are finding security holes just about as fast as the number of devices that are being released.  You cannot even trust a lightbulb these days.

Works Cited

MAITI, A. (2019, September). Light Ears: Information Leakage via Smart Lights . Retrieved from sprite.utsa.edu: https://sprite.utsa.edu/publications/articles/maitiIMWUT19.pdf

Min, S. (2019, October 24). Are “smart” light bulbs a security risk? Retrieved from cbsnews.com: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/are-smart-light-bulbs-a-security-risk/

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